
Security Guidance
PluginThree layers of security checks on agent-written code: rule-based warnings on about 25 risky patterns during edits, a model review of the diff at turn end, and an agent tracing cross-file bugs like IDOR and SSRF at commit. Official Anthropic plugin; needs Python 3.8+ and model API access.
security-guidance
Security review for Claude-generated code. Three layers:
- Pattern warnings — instant regex-based reminders on
Edit/Writefor ~25 known-dangerous patterns (yaml.load,torch.load(weights_only=False),pickle.loadon untrusted data, rawinnerHTML, hardcoded secrets, etc.). - LLM diff review — when Claude finishes a turn, the plugin sends the diff to a fast LLM call (the newest Opus by default) and feeds high-severity findings back to Claude so it can fix them before you see the response.
- Agentic commit review — on
git commit, an SDK-driven reviewer reads related files (Read/Grep/Glob) to trace data flow across the codebase, catching multi-file vulnerabilities pattern matching misses (IDOR, auth bypass, cross-file SSRF).
Findings cover common web-vulnerability classes — injection, XSS, SSRF, hardcoded secrets, IDOR, auth bypass, unsafe deserialization, and path traversal among others.
Install
/plugin install security-guidance@claude-plugins-official
Marketplace ships enabled by default in Claude Code — no setup beyond having the CLI itself.
Prerequisites
- Claude Code CLI ≥ v2.1.144
- Python 3.8+ on
PATH(python3,python, orpy -3— the plugin picks the first that works) - A working API path (subscription, API key, or 3P provider config)
Configuration
All configuration is via environment variables. None are required for default behavior.
Selecting a model
By default both reviews run on the newest Claude Opus, and move to the next one when it is released — there is no model version to bump:
- The LLM diff review asks your API endpoint (
GET /v1/models) which Opus models it serves and uses the newest. The answer is cached for a day in the plugin's state directory. If the endpoint can't answer, the review usesclaude-opus-5-5. - The agentic commit reviewer, and every review on Bedrock, Vertex, and Foundry, runs through your installed Claude Code and uses its
opusalias — the same model/model opusselects, including anyANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODELyou have set.
To pin a model, or to use a cheaper one:
# 1P / gateway: a canonical model id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-5-5
# Bedrock: use the inference-profile id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=us.anthropic.claude-opus-5-5
# Vertex / Foundry: the provider's model id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-5-5
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL controls the LLM diff review. SG_AGENTIC_MODEL (same syntax) controls the agentic commit reviewer.
Enabling/disabling layers
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DISABLE=1 | unset | Kill switch — disables the entire plugin |
ENABLE_PATTERN_RULES=0 | on | Disable layer 1 (regex pattern warnings) |
ENABLE_CODE_SECURITY_REVIEW=0 | on | Disable all LLM reviews (Stop hook + commit/push) |
ENABLE_STOP_REVIEW=0 | on | Disable only the Stop-hook diff review, keeping commit/push reviews. Useful for multi-agent / shared-worktree setups where another agent can move HEAD between a worker's turns |
ENABLE_COMMIT_REVIEW=0 | on | Disable layer 3 (agentic commit review) |
Hook output for other hosts
SECURITY_GUIDANCE_PORTABLE_OUTPUT=1 # default: detected
The hooks' JSON output carries two fields that only Claude Code reads (metrics and rewakeSummary), and the SessionStart hook prints a separate {"async": ...} line first. A host that validates hook output against a closed schema rejects them. In portable mode they are left out, so every hook prints one JSON object with only the standard fields (decision, reason, systemMessage, hookSpecificOutput), and the SessionStart hook runs to completion before the host continues. It turns on by itself when the host passes PLUGIN_ROOT and does not identify itself as Claude Code; set the variable to 1 or 0 to force it either way.
Higher-recall mode
SG_DUAL_OR=on # default off
Runs two parallel review calls and unions the findings. Catches a few percentage points more vulnerabilities in our testing, at roughly 2× the API cost per review. Most users don't need it.
Org-specific policies
Drop a claude-security-guidance.md in any of:
~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md— user-wide rules (whenCLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRis set, the same file in that directory is read too)<project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md— project rules, intended to be committed<project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.local.md— local overrides, intended to be.gitignore'd
All three are loaded and concatenated into the LLM diff review's prompt in the order user → project → project-local. If the combined size exceeds the 8 KB prompt budget, the tail is truncated, so user-wide rules are kept and project-local rules are dropped first. The agentic commit reviewer (layer 3) does not currently read this file. Example:
# Acme security rules
- All SELECTs against the `customers` or `orders` tables MUST go through `db.replica`,
never `db.primary`. Primary is for writes only.
- Background jobs must not use the user-context auth token; they get
service-account creds from `jobs.get_service_account()`.
- Calls to `requests.get(url)` with a user-controlled `url` need
the SSRF-allowlist wrapper at `acme.net.safe_request`.
Built-in rules cover common web-vulnerability classes without it — claude-security-guidance.md is for things specific to your codebase that the model can't infer.
Privacy and data handling
The plugin sends data to a model endpoint to perform its reviews. Specifically, each Stop-hook diff review transmits the changed file paths, the diff hunks, and the relevant file contents in the diff; each agentic commit review additionally transmits any files the reviewer pulls in via Read/Grep/Glob while tracing data flow. Your claude-security-guidance.md contents (user, project, and local) are appended to the prompt on every review, so don't put secrets in it.
Where that data goes depends on your Claude Code configuration:
- Default (Anthropic API / subscription): sent to
api.anthropic.comand handled under Anthropic's Commercial Terms and Privacy Policy. - LLM gateway (
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLset): sent to your gateway URL instead, with the headers inANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS(exceptanthropic-beta). The gateway operator's terms apply. - 3rd-party providers (Bedrock / Vertex / Foundry / Mantle): sent to your configured provider endpoint. The provider's data-handling terms apply (e.g., AWS / GCP / Azure).
The plugin writes its own debug log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt (override with SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DEBUG_LOG). The log contains diffstate metadata, finding categories, the Agent SDK's own warnings and errors, and up to 20 lines per review that the agentic reviewer's inner Claude Code prints to stderr — no full file contents or model prompts — and rotates at 1 MB. Nothing is uploaded.
Review usage and cost
The LLM reviews use your API path, so they cost tokens (or subscription usage) on top of your own session. The default reviewer is the newest Opus model. On the Anthropic API path the diff review on Stop calls the API directly, so it does not appear in Claude Code's own cost figures or transcripts. After each review the plugin writes one line to its debug log:
Review usage: review=stop session=<session id> model=claude-opus-5-5 calls=1 in=31994 out=3250 cache_read=0 cache_write=0 est_cost_usd=0.1930
reviewisstop,commitorpush;sessionis the Claude Code session that triggered it.callscounts API requests for the diff review and reviewer runs for the agentic commit/push review, wheremodelis the model that was asked for (opusby default).est_cost_usdis an estimate at list prices, not a bill: on a subscription the review counts against your usage limits instead. A trailing~means the model had no entry in the plugin's price table and a default rate was used. A review cut short (timeout, session exit) may not be counted.- The log rotates at 1 MB, so copy these lines out if you need a longer history.
To spend less, set SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL (diff review) and SG_AGENTIC_MODEL (commit/push review) to a cheaper model, or turn reviews off (see Enabling/disabling layers).
Limitations
This is a best-effort assistive tool, not a guarantee. Treat findings as suggestions, not as a substitute for human code review, SAST/DAST, dependency scanning, or pen-testing. The reviewer can miss vulnerabilities, produce false positives, and may behave differently across codebases, languages, and model versions. No warranty is provided — use is subject to Anthropic's Commercial Terms.
Troubleshooting
Plugin doesn't seem to fire — check that ~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md (or hook activity) shows in debug logs. Run Claude Code with --debug-file /tmp/claude/debug.txt and grep for security_reminder_hook. The plugin also writes its own log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt.
Review never finds anything — verify your API path works. When a commit or push review gets no usable answer from the model, Claude is told once per session for each kind of review and failure (for example "Commit security review did not complete: …"), and the reason is logged. If a commit whose review failed is pushed later from Claude Code, the push review checks it. On 3P providers, if you set SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL, check it is a provider-specific id your account can invoke. On LLM gateways, check the gateway's logs for POST /v1/messages traffic from the plugin.
Too many false positives — set SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL to a cheaper model (claude-sonnet-5-5) and re-evaluate; if precision is the priority, stay on the default.
Want to silence a specific finding — add a comment to the line explaining why it's safe; the LLM reviewer treats inline justifications as exclusions. For systemic exclusions, document them in your claude-security-guidance.md.
Reporting issues
Open an issue on the security-guidance plugin repo with:
- The Claude Code CLI version (
claude --version) - Provider setup (1P / Bedrock / Vertex / LLM gateway / etc.)
- A minimal repro diff
- The relevant section of
~/.claude/security/log.txt
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